We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed number  of candidates are to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants; the  candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded. Best responses involve votin...

In “The Logic of Campaigning”, Dean and Parikh consider a candidate making campaign statements to appeal to the voters. They model these statements as Boolean formulas over variables that represent stances on the issues, and study optimal candidate strategies under three proposed models of voter preferences based on the assignments that satisfy these formulas. We prove that voter utility evalua...

The paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strategic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. It...

We consider a family of exchange economies where consumers have multiprior preferences representing their ambiguity aversion. Under a linear independence assumption, we prove that regular economies are generic. Regular economies exhibit enjoyable properties: odd finite number of equilibrium prices, local constancy of this number and local differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices. Thu...

In this paper we explore the use of selectional preferences for detecting noncompositional verb-object combinations. To characterise the arguments in a given grammatical relationship we experiment with three models of selectional preference. Two use WordNet and one uses the entries from a distributional thesaurus as classes for representation. In previous work on selectional preference acquisit...

In decision making, negotiation, and other kinds of practical reasoning, it is necessary to model preferences over possible outcomes. Such preferences usually depend on multiple criteria. We argue that the criteria by which outcomes are evaluated should be the satisfaction of a person’s underlying interests: the more an outcome satisfies his interests, the more preferred it is. Underlying inter...

We examine racial preferences in dating. We employ a Speed Dating experiment that allows us to directly observe individual decisions and thus infer whose preferences lead to racial segregation in romantic relationships. Females exhibit stronger racial preferences than males. The richness of our data further allows us to identify many determinants of same-race preferences. Subjects’ backgrounds,...

To what extent, and in what way, do labor unions shape workers’ political preferences? Despite a decline in membership rates, few other organizations have the reach and ongoing access to such a sizable share of the electorate. A key question that arises is the degree to which this access translates into political influence. Empirical analyses often find that union members exhibit political view...

Invoking Yaari's dual theory, we develop a model of individual vaccination decisions that incorporates quasi-hyperbolic discounting, risk aversion, and information. We test the resulting hypotheses for the flu season 2010/2011 using a representative German data set. We find a significant impact of time preferences on immunization decisions. The impact of the discount factor is significantly neg...

This paper explores the causes of domestic conflict over foreign policy in the context of a dynamic learning model. One state is composed of two political parties that are uncertain about how another state will respond to cooperative and confrontational policies. To resolve this uncertainty, they must implement policies and update on the basis of the observed outcome. While both parties have in...