Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games. Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of equilibria of perturbed games. Here, the perturbation has to do with the hypothetical possibility that t...

The popularity of online games has inspired controversial discussion on the effects of game-play in both mass media and academia. However, we know little about ordinary people’s opinions about the effects of game-play. The current study applies the theory of the third-person effect (TPE) to examine people’s perceptions of game effects on self and on others, and detects significant third-person ...

We consider Gillette’s two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. For each k ∈ Z+ we introduce a payoff function, called the k-total reward. For k = 0 and 1 these payoffs are known as mean payoff and total reward, respectively. We restrict our attention to the deterministic case, the so called cyclic games. For all k, we prove the existence of a saddle point which can be rea...

We consider the class of two-person zero-sum allocation games known as Captain Lotto games (Hart 2014). These are Colonel Blotto type games in which the players have capacity constraints. We consider the game with non-strict constraints, and with strict constraints. We show in most cases that when optimal strategies exist, they are necessarily unique. When they don’t exist, we characterize the ...

We consider two-person zero-sum stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information, or BWR-games, given by a digraph G = (V,E), with local rewards r : E → Z, and three types of positions: black VB , white VW , and random VR forming a partition of V . It is a long-standing open question whether a polynomial time algorithm for BWR-games exists, even when |VR| = 0. In fact, a pseudo-polynomial ...

Games arguably have the most impressive success of any computer-based application and it would be useful to be able to extract some of the successful features of games for use in different application areas. Whilst games are clearly a multi-faceted phenomenon, when talking about games, gamers and reviewers often refer to the immersive experience of the game as being of particular importance. Mo...

We establish the existence of a best proximity pair for which the best proximity set is nonempty for a finite family of multimaps whose product is either an Ac -multimap or a multimap T : A → 2 such that both T and S ◦ T are closed and have the KKM property for each Kakutani multimap S : B → 2. As applications, we obtain existence theorems of equilibrium pairs for free n-person games as well as...

In this paper, we consider an interval matrix game with interval valued payoffs, which is the generation of the traditional matrix game. The “saddle-points”of this interval matrix game are defined and characterized as equilibrium points of corresponding non-zero sum parametric games. Numerical examples are given to illustrate our idea. These results are extended to the fuzzy matrix games. Also,...

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out or at least weakens efficiency seeking. Our treat...

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. By defining the stand...