Article history: Received 8 February 2010 Available online 11 February 2010 JEL classification: D50 D51 D53 D61 E40 E50 E51 E52 E58

Article history: Received 30 April 2009 Received in revised form 12 January 2010 Accepted 20 January 2010 Available online 1 February 2010 JEL classification: D44 D81

Article history: Received 6 February 2009 Received in revised form 10 August 2009 Accepted 9 September 2009 Available online 30 September 2009 JEL classification: D71 D72 F53 H11

Article history: Received 7 May 2012 Received in revised form 6 November 2012 Accepted 9 November 2012 Available online 17 November 2012 JEL classification: D81 Q40 G11

This note demonstrates that a result on evolutionary stability, presented by Bester and Güth (1998), applies under more general preference and payoff functions. JEL Classification: C72; A13

Article history: Received 28 March 2013 Received in revised form 4 March 2014 Accepted 4 March 2014 Available online 15 March 2014 JEL classification: F41

We study unique and globally attracting solutions of a general nonlinear equation that has as special cases some recursive equations widely used in Economics. JEL classification: D81 , D91

We study a model in which being more powerful does not necessarily imply being wealthier. r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C7; S477; B201

The Maschler–Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games is axiomatized, by means of a marginality axiom. JEL Classification: C7, D7

Article history: Received 25 August 2007 Received in revised form 1 December 2008 Accepted 20 January 2009 Available online 25 January 2009 JEL classification: D44 L74 C13