We present an effective algorithm for minimization of locally nonconvex Lipschitz functions based on mollifier functions approximating the Clarke generalized gradient. To this aim, first we approximate the Clarke generalized gradient by mollifier subgradients. To construct this approximation, we use a set of averaged functions gradients. Then, we show that the convex hull of this set serves as ...

Kamohara, S., Ishii, K., Okada, T., Ui, M. and Ebina, Y. (1993) Biochem. Biophys. Res. Commun. 195,762-768 12 Okada, T., Kawano, Y., Sakakibara, T., Hazeki, 0. and Ui, M. (1994) J. Biol. Chem. 269, 3568-3573 13 Clarke, J. F., Young, P. W., Yonezawa, K., Kasuga, M. and Holman, G. D. (1994) Biochem. J. 300, 63 1-635 14 Yang, J., Clarke, J. F., Ester, C. J., Young, P. W., Kasuga, M. and Holman, G....

We study the problem of procuring a cheap path in a graph in which the edges are owned by selfinterested agents. We focus on basic properties of a class of generalized Vickrey-Clarke mechanisms for the problem. We show that this class of mechanisms satisfies a monotonicity property that can be used to achieve expected payments which, under certain independence assumption, are significantly bett...

Congestions at loading docks can cause severe delays in logistics processes and cause increasing bottlenecks for truck routes. For warehouses, uncoordinated arrivals of trucks make appropriate staffing difficult and congestions can interfere with other processes at the facility. To mitigate congestions at loading docks, we propose package auctions to allocate time slots to trucks. The contribut...

A multi-unit combinatorial auction is a combinatorial auction that has some items that can be seen as indistinguishable. Although the mechanism can be applied to dynamic electricity auctions and various purposes, it is difficult to apply to large-scale auction problems due to its computational intractability. In this paper, I present an idea and an analysis about an approximate allocation and p...

Future agent mediated eCommerce will involve open systems of agents interoperating between different institutions, where different auction protocols may be in use. We argue that in order to achieve this agents will need a method to automatically verify the properties of a previously unseen auction protocol; for example, they may wish to verify that it is fair and robust to deception. We are the...