In this paper, we present and discuss the findings of two experiments about reference change. Cases change have sometimes been invoked to challenge traditional versions semantic externalism, but relevant cases never tested empirically. The conducted use variants famous Twin Earth scenario test folk intuitions whether natural kind terms such as ‘water’ or ‘salt’ switch after being constantly (mi...

We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. begin by reviewing and arguments from neuroscience philosophy seem to indicate diversity brain processes result in verdicts we ordinarily consider “moral judgments”. if these findings are correct, this plausible reason doubting all judgments necessarily sh...

Can we always tell, just through reflection, what we should believe? That is the question of access, the central disagreement between epistemic internalists and externalists, and the focus of the dissertation. Chapter 1 gives an argument for access, connecting it with the question of whether we can intentionally bias our own investigations to favour desirable hypotheses. I argue that we can't: ...

Introduction Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, an orthodoxy of sorts had gelled in the philosophy of mind around a kind of psychological externalism, the idea that some mental states individuate sensitively to extra-cranial factors. More recently, two trends of thought have departed from this young orthodoxy in opposite directions. On the one hand, a cluster of ideas captured in s...

The task of this essay is to use the ought-implies-can principle (OIC) to clarify and defend Bernard Williams’ claim that all reasons are internal. On the interpretation offered here, the internalism/externalism controversy initiated by Williams is about the indexicality of normative practical reasons. The central question is this: Are all of our reasons anchored to our current beliefs and desi...

J. L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument is one of the key contemporary justifications for atheism and has prompted numerous responses from those defending plausibility belief in God. I will outline a recent counterargument Michael C. Rea, who claims that relationships with God are far more widely available than Schellenberg assumes. However, suggest it invites response proponents because leave...