This paper considers the incentive aspect of the Balanced Linear Cost Share Equilibrium (BLCSE), which yields an endogenous theory of profit distribution for public goods economies with convex production technologies. We do so by presenting an incentive compatible mechanism which doubly implements the BLCSE solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria so that Nash allocations and strong Nash all...

Suppose that a group of agents have demands for some good. Each one of them owns a technology allowing to produce the good, with these technologies varying in their effectiveness. We consider technologies exhibiting either increasing return to scale (IRS) or decreasing returns to scale (DRS). In each case, we solve the issue of the effi cient allocation of the production between the agents. In ...

Using a new representation theorem for additive cost sharing methods as sums of path methods, we show that many of the standard additive cost sharing methods (Aumann-Shapley, Shapley Shubik, and Serial Cost) are consistent. These results follow directly from a simple su cient condition for consistency: being generated by associative paths, which can be used to show consistency for many other me...

OBJECTIVE To assess the effects of ending cost sharing on use of outpatient services and how this was perceived by health workers and members of a health unit management committee. METHODS From 10 districts across Uganda, 78 health facilities were selected. Attendance at these facilities was assessed for eight months before and 12 months after cost sharing ended. The data represented 1 966 52...

Microeconomic theory predicts that if patients are fully insured and providers are paid fee-for-service, utilization of medical services exceeds the efficient level ('moral hazard effect'). In Switzerland, both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing have been introduced to mitigate this problem. Analyzing a panel dataset of about 160,000 adults, we find both types of cost sharing to be effect...

The set of additive cost sharing methods when individual demands are integer valued and cost shares are non negative, is characterized by its extreme points and by a network flow representation. The extreme methods allocate costs incrementally along a chain of demand vectors independent of the cost function. The result generalizes Wang’s characterization in that we do not assume the Dummy axiom.

We investigate cost-sharing mechanisms for scheduling cost-sharing games. We assume that the demand is general—that is, each player can be allocated one of several levels of service. We show how to design mechanisms for these games that are weakly group strategyproof, approximately budget-balanced, and approximately efficient, using approximation algorithms for the underlying scheduling problem...

A competitive, market oriented and rationalized construction tomorrow requires developing of automated and robotized construction system today. This includes industrialized process originating in a mining, construction material production, prefabrication of construction components, on site construction, facility management, rehabilitation and recycling. Today’s construction projects are charact...

In multicast-type services, many receivers share a single data flow. The question is how to split the cost of such a flow among the receivers. There is a need to provide receivers with reasonable feedback on the cost that their network usage incurs. Therefore, cost sharing methods will play an important role in multicast-type services in the future. This paper discusses cost sharing methods whe...

INTRODUCTION To examine (1) what individuals know about the existing adult preventive service coverage provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and (2) which preventive services individuals think should be covered without cost sharing. METHODS An online panel from Survey Monkey was used to obtain a sample of 2,990 adults age 18 and older in March 2015, analyzed 2015-2017. A 17-item survey...