We observe that the problem of deciding the winner in mean payoff games is in the complexity class UP ∩ co-UP. We also show a simple reduction from parity games to mean payoff games. From this it follows that deciding the winner in parity games and the modal μ-calculus model checking are in UP ∩ co-UP.

Tenders or auctions in the construction industry are often held, either public open closed depending on owner and project to be carried out. needed because implementation of a project, both government projects private projects, expects best bid for project. A tender committee is an organization established endorsed which responsible successful auction tender. The north middle Timor regency held...

In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the majority rule winner. We develop fast algorithms for interesting cases with nice combinatorial struct...

Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions (MARAs) are excellent protocols to automate negotiation among sellers. Eliciting the buyer′s preferences and determining the winner are both challenging problems for MARAs. To solve these problems, we propose two algorithms namely MAUT* and CP-net*, which are respectively the improvement of the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) and constrained CP-net. The bu...

This paper presents an extended algorithm for the optimal winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions. This algorithm is essentially based on new graphs of shared and unshared items which enable an oriented exploration of the bids and thus accelerate the search for the optimal solution. The higher the number of bids, the more efficient the graphs. First of all, using an example, the ...

We propose the use of logic-based preference representation languages based on weighted propositional formulas for specifying bids in a combinatorial auction. We then develop several heuristics for a branch-and-bound search algorithm for determining the winning bids in this framework and report on their empirical performance. The logic-based approach is attractive due to its high degree of flex...

We consider the scenario of a parliament that is going to vote on a specific important issue. The voters are grouped in parties, and all voters of a party vote in the same way. The expected winner decision is known, because parties declare their intentions to vote, but before the actual vote takes place some voters may leave the leading party to join other parties. We investigate the computatio...

We consider voting situations in which some candidates may turn out to be unavailable. When determining availability is costly (e.g., in terms of money, time, or computation), voting prior to determining candidate availability and testing the winner’s availability after the vote may be beneficial. However, since few voting rules are robust to candidate deletion, winner determination requires a ...

This paper presents an approximate algorithm for the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions, which is based on limited discrepancy search (LDS). Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and can incorporate largescale, complicated types of auctions including combinatorial auctions, where multiple items are sold simultaneously and bidders can express c...