This paper deals with the Stackelberg game model based on the buyback contract predominated by the supplier, and the equilibrium solutions to the model are available when wholesale price and maximum buyback rate are determined by the supplier and the order quantity is determined by the retailer with respect to the stochastic market demand. Coordination of different supply chains and risks share...

M by the mixed evidence concerning the adoption level and value of collaborative forecasting (CF) implementations in retail supply chains, in this paper, we explore the conditions under which CF offers the highest potential. We consider a two-stage supply chain with a single supplier selling its product to consumers through a single retailer. We assume that both the supplier and the retailer ca...

The first theme of this paper is that direct (product) competition acts as a tournament between retailers when informational problems (or transaction costs) prevent the manufacturer from using contracts based on their relative performances. Anti-competitive restraints such as exclusive territories and resale price maintenance (which, we show, are not necessarily good substitutes) may or may not...

In the Ontario power system, almost all coal power plants have been recently closed. The major power generation in Ontario is currently provided by nuclear power plants (base-load generation). Additionally, wind generation typically is maximum at night, a time period when the demand is minimum. This raises the question whether energy storage systems (ESSs) should be deployed in Ontario to shift...

-The design of wholesale electricity markets through deregulation has focused almost exclusively on the development of competitive supply (generation). The demand side of the market has been virtually ignored. Mostly, this is due to the assumption that electricity demand is almost completely inelastic. As a result, deregulated wholesale markets universally fail to pass price signals down to the...

This paper studies a three-layer supply chain where a manufacturer sells a product through a reseller who then relies on its own salesperson to sell to the end market. The reseller has superior capability in demand forecasting relative to the manufacturer. We explore the main tradeoffs between the risk-reduction effect and the information-asymmetry-aggravation effect of the improved forecasting...

Increased variable renewable energy sources requires more flexibility that could be provided by distributed energy sources located at small end-users. Aggregators could act as intermediary entities to exploit the flexibility potential of small end-users and create value for DSOs by offering congestion management services. An optimization model based on Linear Programming is developed and used t...

Overconfidence is a prevalent and potentially catastrophic behaviour in judgment decision-making. In this paper, we define manufacturers’ overconfidence as belief bias that they overestimate the impact of product greenness on demand accuracy uncertainty. We build game theory model based overconfident beliefs, address decisions price, discuss supply chain profits. For adverse effects brought by ...

W e analyze contracting behaviors in a two-tier supply chain system consisting of competing manufacturers and competing retailers. We contrast the contracting outcome of a Stackelberg game, in which the manufacturers offer take-itor-leave-it contracts to the retailers, with that of a bargaining game, in which the firms bilaterally negotiate contract terms via a process of alternating offers. Th...

Regardless of the form of restructuring, deregulated electricity industries share one common feature: the absence of any significant, rapid demand-side response to the wholesale (or, spot market) price. For a variety of reasons, electricity industries continue to charge most consumers an average cost based on regulated retail tariff from the era of vertical integration, even as the retailers th...