This study explores how social influence approaches alter buyer–seller swift guanxi, trust in the seller and repurchase intention when considering of buyer dependence. Based on results an online survey three cities Taiwan, we empirically test research model using partial least squares analysis. We found that dependence exerts different but positive effects each approach usage only identificatio...

The purpose of this paper is the calculation of Unbalanced Magnetic Force (UMF) in permanent magnet brushless DC (PMBLDC) machines with diametrically asymmetric winding and investigation of UMF variations in the presence of phase advance angle. This paper presents an analytical model of UMF in surface mounted PMBLDC machines that have a fractional ratio of slot number to pole number. This model...

This paper considers a two-stage development problem for information goods with costless quality degradation. In our model, a seller of information goods faces customers that are heterogeneous with regard to both the marginal willingness to pay for quality and the outside opportunity. In the development stage, the seller determines the quality limit of the product. In the second stage, the sell...

I introduce a strategic seller to a standard model of real options. A privately informed seller, such as a startup, tries to court a forward-looking buyer, such as a venture capitalist. The buyer learns gradually about the seller’s quality, high or low, through exogenous news and can “adopt” the seller at any time. The seller pays a flow cost but can exit or privately upgrade its quality at any...

In the framework of a first-price private-value auction, we study the seller as a player in a game with the buyers in which he has private information about their realized valuations. We find that depending upon his information, set of signals, and commitment power he may strategically transmit messages to buyers in order to increase his revenue. In an environment where the seller knows the ran...

A seller possessing private information about the quality of a good attempts to sell it through a second-price auction with announced reserve price. The choice of a reserve price transmits information to the buyers. We compare the outcome of a game where the seller runs himself the auction (signaling) and a game where a monopoly broker chooses the trade mechanism (screening). For the former cas...

The past few years have witnessed the increasing ubiquity of user-generated content on seller reputation and product condition in Internet based used-good markets. Recent theoretical models of trading and sorting in used-good markets provide testable predictions to use to examine the presence of adverse selection and trade patterns in such dynamic markets. A key aspect of such empirical analyse...

This paper deals with a Niskanen type of public-procurement agency. It is shown that the procurement game should be separated into an investment game and a project game, the first game to be played before nature determines the actual realizations of benefit and costs of the project, the second game to be played afterward. In the first game the relationship-specific investments of agency and sel...