CUPE Local 1334 [1] is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all trades, services and maintenance employees of the University of Guelph, employed or normally performing a major part of their work at its campus at Guelph. CUPE Local 1334 [1] Unit 1 is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all interims employed in the Library at the University of Guelph in the City of Guelph for not m...

CUPE Local 1334 [1] is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all trades, services and maintenance employees of the University of Guelph, employed or normally performing a major part of their work at its campus at Guelph. CUPE Local 1334 [1] Unit 1 is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all interims employed in the Library at the University of Guelph in the City of Guelph for not m...

We relate two contract models: one based on event structures and game theory, and the other one based on logic. In particular, we show that the notions of agreement and winning strategies in the game-theoretic model are related to that of provability in the logical model.

Faculty Association [10] The Faculty Association is the representative for all persons employed by the University of Guelph in the City of Guelph, at the Kemptville campus in the Municipality of North Grenville, at the Ridgetown campus in the Municipality of Chatham-Kent, at the Vineland Research Station in Relevant documents are available through the Office of the Provost and Vice-President (A...

Faculty Association [10] The Faculty Association is the representative for all persons employed by the University of Guelph in the City of Guelph, at the Kemptville campus in the Municipality of North Grenville, at the Ridgetown campus in the Municipality of Chatham-Kent, at the Vineland Research Station in Relevant documents are available through the Office of the Provost and Vice-President (A...

We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic function, explicit attention is paid...

The purpose of this contribution1 is to set up a language to evaluate the results of concerted action among interdependent agents against predetermined properties that we can recognise as desirable from a deontic point of view. Unlike the standard view of logics to reason about coalitionally rational action, the capacity of a set of agents to take a rational decision will be restricted to what ...

In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military pro…ciency of the "rich" country is su¢ ciently large, the...