The growth and penetration of broadband access networks to the home has fueled the growth of online games played over the Internet. As we write this article, it is 5am on a typical weekday morning and Gamespy Arcade reports more than 250,000 players online playing about 75,000 games! This proliferation of online games has been matched by an equivalent growth in both the variety of online games ...

for all mixed strategies Al, . ., ,, and i = 1, . . ., n in an n-person game r for all possible assignments of the pay-offfunction h is that r have total recall. Theorem 1 generalizes the theorem of von Neumann which asserts that a zero-sum two-person game with perfect information is strictly determined. It is proved by the same inductive device with a slight variation due to the absence of the...

In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payo is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for two-person generosity games show that participants seem to care more for e ciency than for equity. In three-person generosity games equal agreement payo s for two of the players are either exogeno...

We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for nite n-person games. Classical path following methods, such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm for two person games, and Scarf-type xed point algorithms for n-person games provide globally convergent methods for nding a sample equilibrium. For large problems, methods which are not globally convergent, ...

The first part is the study of several conditions which are sufficient for the coincidence of the prenucleolus concept and the egalitarian nonseparable contribution (ENSC-) method. The main sufficient condition for the coincidence involved requires that the maximal excesses at the ENSC-solution are determined by the ( n 1)-person coalitions in the n-person game. The second part is the study of ...

The solution is given here for the infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum,games of inr complete information characterized by 2 X 2 games, with information matrxces b for the ftrst game and( b ab)for the second game.

William D. Hamilton famously stated that “human life is a many person game and not just a disjoined collection of two person games”. However, most of the theoretical results in evolutionary game theory have been developed for two player games. In spite of a multitude of examples ranging from humans to bacteria, multi-player games have received less attention than pairwise games due to their inh...

Recently, the list of solved two-person zero-sum games with perfect information has increased. The state of current knowledge is that many games are a win for the ®rst player, some games are draws, and only a few games are a win for the second player. For games with three outcomes (won, drawn, lost) a game is commonly de®ned as fair if the theoretical value of the game is drawn. For these games...

Introduction Even though Nash´s theorem asserts the existence of equilibrium points for the mixed extension of a normal game, it does not tell us how to find them. Even in the case of two matrices or two person games many algorithms have been proposed by Vorobev[13], Kuhn[3] and Mangasarian[5] to determine all equilibrium pairs, they are more of theoretical interest than for actual computation....

We provide two axiomatic characterizations of the kernel of TU games by means of both bilateral consistency and converse consistency with respect to two types of 2-person reduced games. According to the first type, the worth of any single player in the 2-person reduced game is derived from the difference of player’s positive (instead of maximum) surpluses. According to the second type, the wort...