Mechanism design uses the tools of economics and game theory to design rules of interaction for economic transactions that will,in principle, yield some desired outcome. In the last few years this field has received much interest of researchers in computer science, especially with the Internet developing as a platform for communications and connections among enormous numbers of computers and hu...

Statistical Problem Classes and Their Links to Information Theory Bertrand Clarke a , Jennifer Clarke b & Chi Wai Yu c a Departments of Medicine and of Epidemiology and Public Health, Center for Computational Science , University of Miami , Miami , Florida , USA b Department of Epidemiology and Public Health , University of Miami , Miami , Florida , USA c Department of Mathematics , Hong Kong U...

K. Robert Clarke is one of the most highly regarded and cited scientists in field ecology. Over past 45+ years, He has inspired empowered ecological researchers all across globe by developing novel statistical methods, creating user-friendly PRIMER software, presenting generous, spirited, personalised workshops multivariate analysis for practicing scientists. We introduce this special issue Aus...

We discuss two nonsmooth functions on Rn introduced by Nesterov. We show that the first variant is partly smooth in the sense of Lewis and that its only stationary point is the global minimizer. In contrast, we show that the second variant has 2n−1 Clarke stationary points, none of them local minimizers except the global minimizer, but also that its only Mordukhovich stationary point is the glo...

A taxonomic revision based on the study of the external morphology and the terminalia of Phygopoda Thomson, 1864 and Pseudophygopoda Tavakilian & Peñaherrera-Leiva, 2007 is presented. The genera and their species are redescribed. Five synonymies are proposed: Panamapoda Clarke, 2014 and Paraphygopoda Clarke, 2014 = Pseudophygopoda Tavakilian & Peñaherrera-Leiva, 2007; Paraphygopoda viridimicans...

This report emerged from the seminar Mechanism Design held in the summer term 2007 at the ITI Sanders, Universität Karlsruhe (TH). It is based on the paper Algorithmic Mechanism Design of Noan Nisan and Amir Ronen [5]. Within this report we try to present their results in an illustrative manner using several additional examples. Mechanism Design is a subfield of game theory. It deals with probl...

In this paper we propose a mechanism for the allocation of pipeline capacities, assuming that participants bidding capacities do have subjective evaluation various network routes. The proposed is based on concept route–quantity pairs. Each participant defines limited number routes and places multiple bids, corresponding to quantities, each these assigns convex combination submitted bids partici...