The problem of generations is important enough to merit serious consideration. It is one of the indispensable guides to an understanding of the structure of social and intellectual movements. Its practical importance becomes clear as soon as one tries to obtain a more exact understanding of the accelerated pace of social change characteristic of our time. It would be regrettable if extra-scient...

Selfish behavior of nodes of a network such as sensors of a geographically distributed sensor network, each of which owned and operated by a different stakeholder may lead to a game theoretic setting called “selfish routing”. The fact that every node strictly aims at maximizing its own utility can cause degradations of social welfare. An issue of concern would be the quantitative measure of thi...

The price of anarchy was introduced to measure the loss incurred by a society of agents who take actions in a decentralized manner instead of through a central authority. Hypergraph coloring has traditionally been studied in the context of a central designer who chooses colors. In this paper we study the price of anarchy when the choice of color is delegated to each of the vertices which are as...

This paper deals with two games defined upon well known generalizations of max cut. We study the existence of a strong equilibrium which is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. Bounds on the price of anarchy for Nash equilibria and strong equilibria are also given. In particular, we show that the max cut game always admits a strong equilibrium and the strong price of anarchy is 2/3.

We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a relationship will flourish or drown, and to measure the success we use a reward function for each relationship. Every agent is trying to maximize the reward from all relati...

We consider n selfish agents or players, each having a load, who want to place their loads to one of two bins. The agents have an incomplete picture of the world: They know some loads exactly and only a probability distribution for the rest. We study Nash equilibria for this model, we compute the Price of Anarchy for some cases and show that sometimes extra information adversely affects the Div...

We characterize the price of anarchy (POA) in weighted congestion games, as a function of the allowable resource cost functions. Our results provide as thorough an understanding of this quantity as is already known for nonatomic and unweighted congestion games, and take the form of universal (cost function-independent) worst-case examples. One noteworthy byproduct of our proofs is the fact that...

In this lecture we examine “players machine” games, where each player chooses a machine to place her job at. We look at a global optimum function. We basically deal with two models: pure, where the players choose a deterministic strategy, and mixed, where the players choose a stochastic strategy (i.e., each chooses a probability distribution over machines). We farther examine different types of...