This paper considers the ranking problem of candidates for a certain position based on ballot papers filled by voters. We suggest a ranking procedure of alternatives using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it is necessary to construct a characteristic function via the filled ballot paper profile of voters. The Shapley value serves as the ranking method. The winner is the candidate havi...

The Shapley value provides a fair method for the division of value in coalitional games. Motivated by the application of crowdsourcing for the collection of suitable labels and features for regression and classification tasks, we develop a method to approximate the Shapley value by identifying a suitable decomposition into multiple issues, with the decomposition computed by applying a graph par...

The present paper studies non-cooperative bargaining models implementing a cooperative solution proposed by Kamijo(2005). The basic idea was inspired by the bidding approach of Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein(2001). They show that this mechanism achieves the Shapley value payoff vector in equilibrium. The solution concept considered in this paper is a generalized Shapley value applied to TU(trans...

In fact the Shapley value is the unique efficient semivalue. This motivated Ruiz et al. to do additive efficient normalization for semivalues. In this paper, by matrix approach we derive the relationship between the additive efficient normalization of semivalues and the Shapley value. Based on the relationship, we axiomatize the additive efficient normalization of semivalues as the unique solut...

A problem of identifying key drivers in customer satisfaction analysis is considered in relation to Kano theory on the relationship between product quality and customer satisfaction using tools from Cooperative Game Theory and Risk Analysis. We use Shapley Value and Attributable Risk techniques to identify priorities of key drivers of customer satisfaction, or key dissatisfiers and key enhancer...

In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache’s axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value ...

We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: The random marginal and the random removal values. The main characteristic of these proposals is that they always select a unique payo¤ allocation in NTU-games. The random marginal value coi...

This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game, the value of a coalition of vertices is the weight of the maximum size matching in the subgraph induced by the coalition. The Shapley value is one of the most important solution c...

The Shapley value (SV) is a fair and principled metric for contribution evaluation in cross-silo federated learning (cross-silo FL), wherein organizations, i.e., clients, collaboratively train prediction models with the coordination of parameter server. However, existing SV calculation methods FL assume that server can access raw public test data. This may not be valid assumption practice consi...

In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache’s axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value ...