نتایج جستجو برای: clarke mechanism

تعداد نتایج: 568792  

2011
E. J. Coffman

In his (2004), Randolph Clarke assesses an important version of an influential argument against libertarianism about metaphysical freedom. Clarke calls the anti-libertarian argument he evaluates the Contrast Argument. It targets the following claim: there could be an undetermined free act done by S such that S would have freely done something else had S not done the act in question. This modal ...

Journal: :IET Communications 2009
Rauf Iqbal Thushara D. Abhayapala Tharaka A. Lamahewa

Clarke’s classical model of mobile radio reception assumes isotropic rich scattering around the mobile receiver antenna. The assumption of isotropic scattering is valid only in limited circumstances. In this contribution we develop a generalized Clarke model, which is applicable to mobile radio reception in general scattering environments. We give expressions for the autocorrelation and power s...

2003
Paul J. Healy

In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, dynamic behavior may affect the efficiency of various mechanisms thought to be efficient in one-shot games. Inspired by results obtained in previous experiments, the current paper proposes a simple best response model in which players’ beliefs are functions of previous strategy profiles. The predictions of the model are found to be highly consiste...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2006
Paul J. Healy

In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, dynamic behavior may affect the efficiency of various mechanisms thought to be efficient in one-shot games. Inspired by results obtained in previous experiments, the current paper proposes a simple best response model in which players’ beliefs are functions of previous strategy profiles. The predictions of the model are found to be highly consiste...

2005
Jonathan M. Borwein Xianfu Wang

In a recent paper we have shown that most non-expansive Lipschitz functions (in the sense of Baire’s category) have a maximal Clarke subdifferential. In the present paper, we show that in a separable Banach space the set of non-expansive Lipschitz functions with a maximal Clarke subdifferential is not only of generic, but also staunch. 1991 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 49J52.

2016
Eylem Levelt Michael Pavlides Masliza Mahmod Catherine Kelly Joanne Sellwood Sheena Thomas Jane M Francis Jurgen E Schneider Chris Rodgers William T Clarke Nikant Sabharwal Charalambos Antoniades Kieran Clarke Theodoros D Karamitsos Oliver Rider Stefan Neubauer

Cardiac and hepatic phenotype of diabetes in the presence and the absence of obesity mechanistic role of ectopic/visceral adiposity Eylem Levelt, Michael Pavlides, Masliza Mahmod, Catherine Kelly, Joanne Sellwood, Sheena Thomas, Jane M Francis, Jurgen E Schneider, Chris Rodgers, William T Clarke, Nikant Sabharwal, Charalambos Antoniades, Kieran Clarke, Theodoros D Karamitsos, Oliver Rider, Stef...

Journal: :Han'gug simlihag hoeji. sangdam gwa simli chi'lyo 2021

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Journal: :Operations Research 2003
James Schummer Rakesh V. Vohra

We examine the mechanism design problem for a single buyer to procure purchase-options for a homogeneous good when that buyer is required to satisfy an unknown future demand. Suppliers have 2dimensional types in the form of commitment costs and production costs. The efficient schedule of options depends on the distribution of demand. To implement an efficient outcome, we introduce a class of me...

Journal: :CoRR 2012
Darrell Hoy Kamal Jain Christopher A. Wilkens

A single advertisement often benefits many parties, for example, an ad for a Samsung laptop benefits Microsoft. We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show that standard solutions, including the status quo ignorance of mutual benefit and a benefit-aware Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, perform poorly. In contrast, we show that an appropriate first-price auction has nice equ...

2008
Felix Bierbrauer

We study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their productive abilities and their preferences for public goods. A mechanism design approach is used to characterize implementable tax and expenditure policies. A robustness requirement in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) yields individual incentive compatibility constraints that are equivalent to those...

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