In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies, Lobby 0 and Lobby 1, compete by bidding for legislators’ votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving first suffers from a second mover advantage and will make an offer to a panel of ...

Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: Evidence from the US Cellular Industry

This paper investigates the effects of business tax lobbying in the presence of investments that are sunk or costly to adjust in the short run. We show that industries which rely more heavily on sunk capital are generally more successful in obtaining tax breaks through lobbying; this reverses the usual logic of the capital levy problem. Nevertheless, these industries invest less in long-run equ...

Are national or multinational firms better lobbyists? This paper analyzes the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting regulation levels for national and multinational firms. We identify three countervailing forces, the easier-to-shut-down effect, the easier-to-curbexports effect and the mult...