Shill bidding occurs when fake bids are introduced into an auction on the seller’s behalf in to artificially inflate final price. The seller either has associates bid auctions, or controls multiple bidder accounts that used for shill bidding. We proposed a reputation system referred as Score indicates how likely is be engaging price inflating behaviour specific auctions. A potential can observe...

In this paper, several seller–buyer supply chain models are proposed which incorporate both cost factors as well as elements of competition and cooperation between seller and buyer. We assume that unit marketing expenditure and unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. The relationships between seller and buyer will be modeled by non-cooperative and coopera...

We model competition between two firms selling identical goods to customers who arrive in the market stochastically. Shoppers choose where to purchase based upon both price and the time cost associated with waiting for service. One seller provides two separate queues, each with its own server, while the other seller has a single queue and server. We explore the market impact of the multi-server...

Digital watermarking protocols are the one, which have combined fingerprinting technique with watermarking, for embedding digital signal or watermark into an original multimedia object. Buyer-seller watermarking protocol is fundamentally applied to continue the digital rights of both buyers and seller. We proposed an identity-based buyer-seller watermarking protocol that encounters various weak...

The rapid advance in information technology now makes it feasible for sellers to condition their price offers on consumers’ prior purchase behavior. In this paper we examine when it is profitable to engage in this form of price discrimination. Our baseline model involves rational consumers with constant valuations for the good being sold and a monopoly merchant who can commit to a pricing polic...

When the seller of an asset grants a right-of-first-refusal to a buyer, this special buyer has the opportunity to purchase the asset at the best price the seller can obtain from the other potential buyers. We show that the right-of-first-refusal is inefficient, and it benefits the special buyer at the expense of the seller and other buyers. In a private values model, the benefit from granting a...

When information is costly, a seller may wish to prevent prospective buyers from acquiring information, for the cost of information acquisition is ultimately borne by the seller. A seller can achieve the desired prevention of information acquisition through posted-price selling, by offering prospective buyers a discount that is such as to deter them from gathering information. No such preventio...