We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of literature on reputations where such considerations mitigate myopic incentive problems. We also show that in models where all parties have long-run objectives, such losses can be avoided.

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on twoperiod moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.

Current incentive structures are more favorably aligned with the world’s problems than their solutions. We conceptualize this as paradox of incentives to argue need for new thinking and restructuring break during COVID-19 pandemic beyond, create opportunities societal transformation.

Peer discovery via distributed message relaying is an important function of a P2P system in which the resources/services provided by peers and service/resource providers may change frequently. The usual searching protocols create huge burden on communications or cause long response time. Appropriate incentives are required to avoid free-riding and achieve efficient cooperations in message relay...

Misrepresenting private information is often costly, for technological, legal, or psychological reasons. I develop a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS), but with a convex cost of lying or misreporting. There are three main results. First, I prove that a sequence of monotone equilibria converges to a CS equilibrium as the cost of misreporting shri...

BACKGROUND Evidence regarding the effectiveness of incentive spirometry (ISy) on postoperative pulmonary outcomes after thoracic, cardiac and abdominal surgery remains inconclusive. This is attributed to various methodological issues inherent in ISy trials. Patient compliance has also been highlighted as a possible confounding factor; however, the status of evidence regarding patient compliance...

A smartphone-based tidal volume (V(T)) estimator was recently introduced by our research group, where an Android application provides a chest movement signal whose peak-to-peak amplitude is highly correlated with reference V(T) measured by a spirometer. We found a Normalized Root Mean Squared Error (NRMSE) of 14.998% ± 5.171% (mean ± SD) when the smartphone measures were calibrated using spirom...

The objective of the present study was to evaluate incentive spirometers using volume- (Coach and Voldyne) and flow-oriented (Triflo II and Respirex) devices. Sixteen healthy subjects, 24 +/- 4 years, 62 +/- 12 kg, were studied. Respiratory variables were obtained by respiratory inductive plethysmography, with subjects in a semi-reclined position (45 masculine). Tidal volume, respiratory freque...

We show that in a class of I–agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment has no value for the principal, randomization has no value for the principal, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, there is an equilibrium with a relatively simple structure in which the principal obtains the same outcome without commitment as the best he can achieve with commitment.