We consider a new class of cooperative cost sharing games, associated with the economic lot-sizing problem with remanufacturing options (ELSR). As a preliminary step, we investigate the relative strength and integrality gaps of various mathematical optimization formulations of ELSR. Using insights from these results, we study the core of the associated cost sharing game. We show that the cost s...

We identify how to share costs locally in weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions to minimize the worst-case price of anarchy (POA). First, we prove that among all cost-sharing methods that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the Shapley value minimizes the worst-case POA. Second, if the guaranteed existence condition is dropped, then the proportional cost-sharing ...

Sharing economy, a distributed peer-to-peer eco-nomic paradigm, gives rise to a variety of social interactionsfor economic reasons. One common distributed decision-makingprocess is the coalition formation to share certain replaceable re-sources collaboratively, for example, sharing hotel rooms amongtravelers, sharing taxi-rides among passengers, and sharingregular passes...

In this paper we discuss a tag-based model that facilitates knowledge sharing. Sharing the knowledge incurs a cost for the sharing agent, and thus non-sharing is the preferred option for selfish agents. Through agent-based simulations we show that knowledge sharing is possible even in the presence of non-sharing agents in the population. We also show that the performance of an agent society can...

A fair cost allocation scheme is critical for forming and sustaining horizontal cooperation that leads to cost reductions. In order to incentivize suppliers to cooperate in freight consolidation, we design a cost-sharing mechanism to solve a cost allocation problem arising in freight consolidation among small suppliers: that is, suppliers whose total demand fits into one truckload. This cost-sh...