In the “The curse of simultaneity”, Paes Leme at al. show that there are interesting classes of games for which sequential decision making and corresponding subgame perfect equilibria avoid worst case Nash equilibria, resulting in substantial improvements for the price of anarchy. This is called the sequential price of anarchy. A handful of papers have lately analysed it for various problems, y...

In prevailing Western media discourses, older women’s anger and resistance are often portrayed as a result of the physical mental decline inherently associated with ageing. These representations reinforce image women vulnerable subjects who weak, frail excluded from society. This article proposes an alternative reading expressions unruliness related to ageing, gender sexuality in visual culture...

We study utility games (Vetta, FOCS 2002) where a set of players join teams to produce social utility, and receive individual utility in the form of payments in return. These games have many natural applications in competitive settings such as labor markets, crowdsourcing, etc. The efficiency of such a game depends on the profit sharing mechanism – the rule that maps utility produced by the pla...

The Price of Anarchy [Koutspoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999] is the, by now celebrated, ratio used to measure how system performance is affected by the selfish behaviour of agents using it. In this work we show bounds on the Price of Anarchy for problems of restricted scheduling of selfish jobs on related and unrelated machines.

We introduce Colored Resource Allocation Games as a new model for selfish routing and wavelength assignment in multifiber all-optical networks. Colored Resource Allocation Games are a generalization of congestion and bottleneck games where players have their strategies in multiple copies (colors). We focus on two main subclasses of these games depending on the player cost: in Colored Congestion...

We analyze the performance of resource allocation mechanisms for markets in which there is competition amongst both consumers and suppliers (namely, two-sided markets). Specifically, we examine a natural generalization of both Kelly’s proportional allocation mechanism for demand-competitive markets [9] and Johari and Tsitsiklis’ proportional allocation mechanism for supply-competitive markets [...

We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of noncooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds on the strong price of anarchy, the loss of quality of coalitionally stable outcomes, as well as bounds on coalitional versions of coarse correlated equilibria...

Public policy and individual incentives determine the patterns of human mobility through transportation networks. In the event of a health emergency, the pursuit of maximum social or individual utility may lead to conflicting objectives in the routing strategies of network users. Individuals tend to avoid exposure so as to minimize the risk of contagion, whereas policymakers aim at coordinated ...