نتایج جستجو برای: ownership of seller

تعداد نتایج: 21166854  

2001
Dan Gode Partha Mohanram

We estimate implied cost of equity capital (re) for a sample of firms from 1984 to 1998 using the Ohlson and Juettner (2000) model that does not make restrictive assumptions about clean surplus and payout policies. We find that re is strongly positively associated with conventional risk factors such as earnings variability, systematic and unsystematic return volatility, and leverage, and is neg...

Bahman Khosravipour Maisam Rafe, Mansour Ghanian Maryam Roozbahani, Masoud Baradaran Sayed Ali Moosavi

The purposeof this studywas to Analyzing factors that effecting on rangeland degradation. Statistical population of this research consisted of whole farmer in Pirtaj district (N= 1600); from that 120 farmer were selected as sample using cluster sampling. The main tool to collect data was a researcher made questionnaire that Content validity of the questionnaire was approved, by a panel of exper...

Abas Karimi, Ali Karimi,

Undoubtedly, the mental health of the society is effective in the progress and development of the country and an important part of this mental health is due to the trust and confidence of economic activists in their investment. Considering that the realm of important investments is land and immovable property, and if the ownership of these lands is shaky, the whole property and economy system w...

Journal: :International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning 2021

Upon assuming political office, the ANC government instituted a land redistribution programme to address ownership injustice perpetrated during apartheid regime whereby non-white citizens owned only 7% of in South Africa. However, has not achieved set target; thus, this study sought understand challenges curtailing successful implementation programme. The used qualitative research approach. An ...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2007
Tao Zhu Neil Wallace

A new theory of coexistence of money and higher-return assets is set out. It applies to any setting in which some trade involves an exchange of goods for assets and occurs between two people–a buyer and a seller. We show that there exists a function mapping the portfolios of the buyer and the seller to the trade that occurs such that (i) the trade is in the buyer-seller core and (ii) some peopl...

1996
R. Preston McAfee Daniel Vincent

In auctions where a seller can post a reserve price but if the object fails to sell cannot commit never to attempt to resell it, revenue equivalence between repeated first price and second price auctions without commitment results. When the time between auctions goes to zero, seller expected revenues converge to those of a static auction with no reserve price. With many bidders, the seller equi...

2015
Ronald A. Dye

We study a model of the seller of an asset who is liable for damages to buyers of the asset if, after the sale, the seller is discovered to have failed to disclose an estimate of the asset’s value that the seller knew prior to sale. The model yields some surprising predictions concerning how the seller’s disclosure decision changes with changes in the severity of this liability, and with other ...

2009
James J. Anton Gary Biglaiser

We examine the market power of a seller who repeatedly offers upgraded versions of a product. In the case of pure monopoly, the seller also controls compatibility across versions. In the case of an entrant who offers an upgrade, the incumbent seller also controls subsequent interoperability across versions. We argue that control of compatibility and interoperability does not allow an incumbent ...

2003
Chifeng Dai

I analyze how a buyer optimally contracts with a seller who is privately informed about his information structure, i.e., his ability of acquiring private signals containing imperfect cost information. I demonstrate that the seller ranks information structures according to the order of their signal distributions in the sense of second order stochastic dominance. Optimal contracts offer sellers w...

2006
Are Bent David McAdams Michael Schwarz

In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such opportunistic behavior (whether by the buyers or the seller) is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium, in the form of lower revenues. Consequently, the seller is willing to pay an auctioneer to credibly commit to a mech...

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