The truth of an utterance depends on various factors. Usually these factors are assumed to be: the meaning of the sentence uttered, the context in which the utterance was made, and the way things are in the world. Recently, however, a number of cases have been discussed where there seems to be reason to think that the truth of an utterance is not yet fully determined by these three factors, and...

It has often been proposed that claims about what is funny, delicious, or likely are “subjective,” in the sense that their truth depends not only on how things are with the objects they explicitly concern, but on how things are with some subject not explicitly mentioned. This thought is supported by the striking degree to which we differ in our judgements about these matters. If there are wholl...

Few philosophers have been tempted to be relativists about absolutely everything—although, we are told, there have been some notable exceptions (Protagoras). Many philosophers, however, have been tempted to be relativists about specific domains of discourse, especially about those domains that have a normative character. Gilbert Harman, for example, has defended a relativistic view of morality,...

Relativism, in the sense at issue here, is a view about the meaning of knowledge attributions—statements of the form “S knows that p.” Like contextualism, it holds that the truth of knowledge claims is sensitive to contextual factors, such as which alternatives are relevant at the context, or how high the stakes are. For the relativist, however, the relevant context is the context from which th...

All knowledge belongs to narrative knowledge, and also local knowledge. Post-modernism can be defined as “elimination of grand narrative”, so in the world of post-modernism, validity of knowledge has become an issue. Local knowledge emphasizes that generation and justification of knowledge has its local features, so it has no way to surpass the dilemma of cultural relativism. Theoretically, in ...

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