Wright’s Truth and Objectivity seeks to systematise a variety of anti-realist positions. I argue that many objections to the system are avoided by transposing its talk of truth into talk of warrant. However, a problem remains about debates involving ‘direction-of-fit’. Dummett introduced ‘anti-realism’ as a philosophical view informed by mathematical intuitionism. Subsequently, the term has bee...

Disseminating scientific knowledge and teaching responsible conduct to people involved in research and scientific activities is a prerequisite for the efficiency and integrity of scientific information (16). However, one important challenge scientists face today is conveying scientific information to the public clearly and directly (3). Another challenge is related to peer-review biases (11, 12...

We disagree with the assertion that recent human-caused invasions differ substantially from historic natural invasions in their magnitudes and impacts on ecological processes. The position that exotic species are inherently ‘bad’ and should be eradicated is an ethical judgement, usually based on the naturalist fallacy or xenophobic prejudice; it is not a scientific judgement. The role of scient...

Most philosophers, whether they consider themselves naturalists or not, typically think that we can talk and think about objects in the world which are themselves independent of our conception of them. Unfortunately, providing a naturalistic explanation of how we can do this has proved notoriously difficult. In particular, naturalistic accounts of intentionality have had problems explaining how...

The first half of this paper replies to three postmodernist challenges to belief in objective intrinsic value. One lies in the claim that the language of objective value presupposes a flawed, dualistic distinction between subjects and objects. The second lies in the claim that there are no objective values which do not arise within and/or depend upon particular cultures or valuational framework...

In proposing their pragmatic case study method, in which a database of cases is said to provide a basis for inductively deriving general “guidelines” or “rules of thumb” for use in future cases, Ronald Miller and Daniel Fishman each claim that a new epistemology is needed if a proper science of clinical/applied psychology is to be developed. In this article I challenge that claim in three ways:...