Abstract Some in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between Liar paradox and semantic relativism : view truth values of certain occurrences sentences depend on contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (Erkenntnis 82(4):913–928, 2017) argues contextualist accounts committed to relativism, Rudnicki ?ukowski (Synthese 1–20, 2019) propose new account classify as relativist...

In Zwei Arten von Relativismus , Max Kölbel wants to make a substantial distinction between two types of truth-relativism. According to Kölbel, indexical relativism detects hidden indexicality in certain statements (e.g. moral judgments). This leads indexical relativists to claim that the proposition expressed by such a statement is relative to a further parameter in the context of use (e.g. a ...

themajor problem of the present article is to investigate relation betweenepistemological behaviorism and epistemological pluralism or relativism. can webelieve in epistemological behaviorism and set aside representationalism andthe same time we reject relativism and believe that the concept of truth playsthe key role in our understanding of the world and of the mind of agents. inthis article, ...

In recent years, a number of new trends have seen light at the intersection of semantics and philosophy of language. They are meant to address puzzles raised by the context-sensitivity of a variety of natural language constructions, such as knowledge ascriptions, belief reports, epistemic modals, indicative conditionals, quantifier phrases, gradable adjectives, temporal constructions, vague pre...

Anyone who has taught an introductory ethics course or a professional ethics class has likely heard students writing off ethics and ethics instruction as unimportant, offering as evidence some type of moral relativism. Even if the instructor is sympathetic towards a particular version of moral relativism, students’ relativist claims can be disconcerting and can seriously detract from their will...

Epicurean epistemology is infamous for the claim that all sense-perceptions are true. 1 This is how Lucretius puts it: what is perceived by any of the senses at any given time is true ( De Rerum Natura [ DRN ] 4.499). This claim—which I shall call SPT—seems deeply misguided. It appears obvious that sense-perception can err. The plan for this chapter is to show that SPT is a sophisticated philos...