This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals’judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We …rst translate a proof o...

We analyze a sequential decision model with one-sided commitment in which decision makers are allowed to choose the time of acting (exercising a risky investment option A) or waiting. We characterize information cascade under endogenous ordering and show that with endogenous ordering, if the number of decision makers is large and decision makers are patient enough, at any fixed time, nearly all...

We investigate judgment aggregation by assuming that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and the Independence condition (formula-wise aggregation) holds for them, though perhaps not for others. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is non-degenerate depends on how premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We identify necessa...

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. By defining the stand...

In recent years, many developments have been made in matching theory and its applications to market design. This paper surveys them and suggests possible research directions. The main focus is on the advances in matching theory that try to solve market design problems in practical markets where the classic theory is inapplicable. Specifically, we discuss the recent theory of matching in large m...

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preference...

A mechanism is pairwise strategy-proof if groups of size one and two never have an incentive to manipulate. When agents have strict preferences over their own outcomes, I show that pairwise strategy-proofness even eliminates incentives for any group of agents to manipulate, therefore implying group strategy-proofness. It is also equivalent to Maskin monotonicity. I obtain the equivalence result...

So far, the theory of distributive justice has tried to single out a unique criterion of justice. However, different people hold conflicting ideas about justice. We propose a procedure for representing these individual opinions by means of ``aspiration functions.'' We present three different ways of aggregating such opposing opinions into a socially acceptable judgement. Furthermore, we show th...

The planner wants to give k identical, indivisible objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k + 1)st-price sealed-bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This simple mechanism implements the desired outcome in iteratively undominated s...

A benevolent Planner wishes to assign an indivisible private good to n claimants, each valuing the object differently. Individuals have quasi-linear preferences. Therefore, the possibility of transfers is allowed. A second-best efficient mechanism is a strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism that is not Pareto dominated by another strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism. In this context, we ident...