In this paper, we propose a novel method of reward design for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). One the main uses MARL is building cooperative policies between self-interested agents. We take inspiration from concept mechanism game theory to modify how agents are rewarded in algorithms. defined payment that reflects negative contribution other agents’ valuation same manner as Vickrey-C...

Noam Chomsky argues that only a meager percentage of the world, consisting of mainly large corporations and developed nations, prosper from globalization. As stated in Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-System Theory, the modern system of the world, which is constructed according to the economic status of nations, can be divided into three levels: the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. Whil...

For the problem of allocating resources among multiple strategic agents, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, and it never incurs a deficit. However, in general, under the VCG mechanism, payments flow out of the system of agents, which reduces the agents’ utilities. VCG redistribution mechanisms aim to return as much of the VCG payments as possible ...

Mechanism design provides a framework to solve distributed optimization problems in systems of self-interested agents. The combinatorial auction is one such problem, in which there is a set of discrete items to allocate to agents. Unfortunately, recent results suggest that it is impossible to implement reasonable approximations without losing robustness to manipulation. Furthermore, the Vickrey...

In this paper we investigate extensions of the well-known Vickrey[1961]-Clarke[1971]Groves[1973] (VCG) mechanisms to problems whose objective function is not utilitarian and whose agents’ utilities are not quasi-linear. We provide a generalization of utilitarian problems, termed consistent problems, and prove that every consistent problem admits a truthful mechanism. These mechanisms, termed VC...