Using Satisficing Game Theory for Performance Evaluation of Banks’ Branches (Case Study in the Mellat Bank)

Due to its role in the identification of inefficient branches and deciding the consistency of their activities, evaluating the performance of a bankchr('39')s branches is one of the most important decisions in the field of development and regulation of branch network. In this paper, the satisfactory functions based on game theory strategies have been utilized in order to evaluate the individual and within-group performance of the bankchr('39')s branches. The proposed approach is based on a cooperative game theory, and the number of players is equal to the number of units which must be evaluated. The satisficing equilibrium set includes the options which are qualified as “good enough” or the efficient units which are both individually and within-group efficient. By applying our analytical method to the bank Mellat case study, we have presented solutions to improve the efficiency of inefficient branches and the branches which are only individually or within-group efficient using sensitivity analysis techniques. Lastly, if efficiency improvement is not possible, we have suggested omitting the branch.