Crisis in Venezuela: A Politico Economic Understanding

author

  • Peu Gosh Department of Political Science
Abstract:

More than five years down the line Venezuela had been slipping into an economic cri-sis. An economy wholly dependent on the sale of oil and no diversification of economic production is sure to face such a crisis. The fluctuation in oil prices is sure to hurt the market and the economy. To make matters worse, Venezuela now faces a political crisis with two individuals claiming themselves to be Presidents, Maduro and Guaidó. On the top of that, the current regime is alleged of massive corruption and an anti-democratic stance. There is always repression and suppression of democratic voices and protestors face persecution and human rights abuses. Such precarious condition of Venezuela eco-nomically and politically makes it vulnerable to external players may be private oil companies or even extra-regional States/powers. The paper will focus on the economic and political crisis in Venezuela. It will also point out at its fall out in the form of a hu-manitarian crisis and its impact on the neighboring countries of Latin America. As Ve-nezuela is caught between the politics of big powers, the solution becomes more prob-lematic and the paper will make an attempt to project that.

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Journal title

volume 9  issue 2

pages  13- 20

publication date 2019-06-01

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