Bertrand-nash Equilibrium in the Retail Duopoly Model under Asymmetric Costs
author
Abstract:
In this paper, the Bertrand's price competition in the retail duopoly with asymmetric costs is analyzed. Retailers sell substitute products in the framework of the classical economic order quantity (EOQ) model with linear demand function. The market potential and competitor price are considered to be the bifurcation parameters of retailers. Levels of the barriers to market penetration depending on the bifurcation parameters are analyzed. The conditions of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in parametric and trigonometric forms are found.
similar resources
Duopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
Consider a symmetric differentiated duopoly model in which firms have private market data about the uncertain demand. We analyze two types of duopoly information equilibrium, Cournot and Bertrand, which emerge, respectively, from quantity and price competition, and show that the incentives for information sharing and its welfare consequences depend crucially on the type of competition, the natu...
full textBertrand and Cournot competition under asymmetric costs: number of active firms in equilibrium
We compare the number of active firms, i.e. the number of firms producing a positive quantity, in equilibrium across four different models of oligopoly: Cournot and Bertrand with homogeneous or differentiated goods. We concentrate on the linear demand structure with constant marginal but asymmetric costs. (With symmetric costs, the results trivialize to all firms active or all firms inactive.) ...
full textEvaluating All Bertrand-nash Equilibria in a Discrete Spatial Duopoly Model
This paper studies a spatial duopoly model where customers are located at nodes and the demand functions are given for each node. For any fixed location of two firms, we analyze Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium. We present an algorithm to compute all equilibria, provided profit functions have a finite number of peaks. The...
full textOn the Existence of Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium Prices Under Logit Demand
This article proves the existence of equilibrium prices in Bertrand competition with multi-product firms using the Logit model of demand. The most general proof, an application of the PoincareHopf Theorem, does not rely on restrictive assumptions such as singleproduct firms, firm homogeneity or symmetry, homogeneous product costs, or even concavity of the utility function with respect to prices...
full textNash equilibrium in duopoly with products defined by two characteristics
This article analyzes the analogue ofHotellingls duopoly model when products are dejned by two characteristics. Using the assumptions of the original model of Hotelling, we show that demand and projt functions are continuous for a wide class of utility functions. When the utilityfunction is linear in the Euclidean distance in the space of characteristics, a noncooperative equilibrium in prices ...
full textQuantum approach to Bertrand duopoly
The aim of the paper is to study the Bertrand duopoly example in the quantum domain. We use two ways to write the game in terms of quantum theory. The first one adapts the Li-Du-Massar scheme for the Cournot duopoly. The second one is a simplified model that exploits a two qubit entangled state. In both cases we focus on finding Nash equilibria in the resulting games.
full textMy Resources
Journal title
volume 30 issue 6
pages 859- 866
publication date 2017-06-01
By following a journal you will be notified via email when a new issue of this journal is published.
Hosted on Doprax cloud platform doprax.com
copyright © 2015-2023