Behavioral Perspectives on Central Bank Communication for Financial Stability
author
Abstract:
Analyzing central bank communication during financial crises, we draw on a surprisingly informative parallel between management of natural disasters such as earthquakes on one hand, and the corresponding communication infrastructure and social interaction during financial turmoil, on the other. The role of social and emotional behavior thereof points to the importance of interpersonal communication for the dissemination of central bank information in a turbulent context. Overall, our research results inform central banks’ attempts to coordinate the desideration of monetary policy, prudential supervision and financial stability in a framework that takes into account social and psychological challenges in the financial markets and the society.JEL Classification: D03, D83, E58, G01
similar resources
Central bank in managing financial stability and economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Financial system of B&H is “bank dominated”, which means that banks (credit institution) is dominated financial institutions in the financial system. Banks have major role in financial intermediation process between deficit and surplus money unites. Having on mind specific features of financial systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina it’s important to analyses characteristics each segment of fi...
full textBank Funding and Financial Stability
The crisis of 2007–2008 was a crisis of collateral. Since then, financial market participants – particularly in the euro area and the United States – have shown an increased appetite for secured lending. In short-term bank funding markets, there has been a pronounced shift towards repurchase arrangements. And covered bonds have gained in popularity in long-term funding markets. The cyclical fli...
full textFinancial Dollarization and Central Bank Crediblity.∗
Why do firms and banks hold foreign currency denominated liabilities? In this paper, we argue that foreign currency debt, by altering the effect of a devaluation on output, has a disciplining effect when the Central Bank’s objectives differ from the social optimum. However, under imperfect information, bad priors about the Central Bank induce excess dollarization of liabilities, which in turn l...
full textSusan Schmidt Bies: Enterprise perspectives in financial institution supervision (Central Bank Articles and Speeches)
Thank you for inviting me to speak at your conference honoring Phillip I. Blumberg. I certainly wish to join you in congratulating him on publication of the new edition of The Law of Corporate Groups. Dean Blumberg speaks of the inadequacy of the traditional concept of separate corporate juridical personality when applied to the modern reality of large multinational corporations that have holdi...
full textEconomic Stability and the Central Bank: Rule of Discretion
The history of monetary policy in Iran, judging by their performance in keeping the value of the currency, maintaining a steady growth in the Gross Domestic Product, faltering investment, show that monetary policy has not been a portrait of consistent successes, to say the least. As a result of the recent studies two rules have emerged as guideline for policy makers: Taylor rule and McCallum ru...
full textAndrew Crockett: Monetary policy and financial stability (Central Bank Articles and Speeches)
It is an issue that is both important and timely. Important, because we need to ensure that arrangements for the pursuit of price stability do not inadvertently endanger the stability of the financial system. And we need to ensure that financial system weaknesses do not impede the effective operation of monetary policy. Timely, because the new Basel Capital Accord is focussing additional attent...
full textMy Resources
Journal title
volume 6 issue None
pages 41- 79
publication date 2012-04
By following a journal you will be notified via email when a new issue of this journal is published.
Hosted on Doprax cloud platform doprax.com
copyright © 2015-2023