Disgust disposal effect 1 Running head : DISGUST PROMOTES DISPOSAL

We propose that incidental disgust (i.e. disgust triggered by a factor unrelated to the decision at hand) can influence the choice between two commodities, even when decision makers are unaware of the influence. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that decision makers exposed to an incidental disgust prime (as opposed to a neutral prime) would be more likely to dispose of a status-quo object in favor of an alternative object. Consistent with this hypothesis, disgust did indeed carry over to unrelated decisions, increasing the frequency with which decision makers traded away something owned for something new, thereby countering the status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Decision makers were unaware of the carryover and failed to correct for it, even when explicitly warned to do so. Because the studies presented real choices with tangible rewards, the findings have implications not only for theories of affect and choice but also for practical improvements in everyday decisions. Disgust disposal effect 3 Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring the Status Quo Charles Darwin (1872) defined disgust as “...something revolting, primarily in relations to the sense of taste...” (p. 253). His analysis treated disgust as a basic emotion along with anger, fear, sadness, and happiness (Ekman & Davidson, 1994). Indeed, disgust satisfies all the modern criteria of a basic emotion articulated by Ekman (1992), which encompass distinctive behavioral, physiological, and expressive components as well as experiential components. More recent definitions have stressed the function of disgust to trigger rejection of badtasting or health-threatening food (e.g., Angyal, 1941; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Frijda, 1986). Thus, disgust has been assumed to play a role of indicating that a substance should be avoided, or if ingestion has already occurred, should be expelled. Rozin, who has extensively studied the evolution of disgust, extended the concept by observing that -beyond food-related stimuli -anything that reminds us of our animal origins can elicit disgust (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). These studies find that, in addition to food, as many as eight domains including body products, animals, sexual behaviors, contact with death or corpses, violations of the exterior envelope of the body, poor hygiene, interpersonal contamination, and certain moral offenses can elicit disgust. Such a wide range of elicitors makes disgust a common experience in daily life. People often come across both physical and social elicitors that cause an intense subjective experience of disgust. Indeed, Heath, Bell, and Sternberg (2001) identified disgust as one of the emotions most frequently evoked by contemporary urban legends that propagate through sub-cultures and drive mass-scale consumer behavior. For example, rumors of food contamination often elicit social panic. Two recent high-impact advertising campaigns have utilized feelings of disgust to influence people’s behaviors. The graphic warning labels introduced on Canadian cigarette Disgust disposal effect 4 packages are reported to have elicited strong disgust from smokers, which were correlated with greater likelihood of either quitting or reducing smoking (Hammond, Fong, McDonald, Brown, & Cameron, 2004). More recently, disgust has been successfully employed in a public health campaign for hand washing (Duhigg, 2008)—with ads showing mothers and children walking out of bathrooms with a glowing purple pigment on their hands that contaminated everything they touched. The campaign increased the use of soap after toilet use by associating disgust with such activity. Considering its widespread role in society, the effects of disgust on people’s everyday choices deserve investigation. To date, however, disgust has received only scant attention in experiments of individual decision making where causality can be assessed. In the present studies, we examined how disgust affects choices between something already possessed and an alternative not yet possessed. Such choices are common, involving, for example, jobs, significant others, and many physical possessions. Under ordinary circumstances, decision makers faced with this sort of choice reliably favor retaining a status quo over other options This status quo bias (SQB) persists even when a current possession has been randomly and/or arbitrarily assigned (e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), and even when retaining the status quo option confers financial cost (e.g., Hartman, Doane, & Woo, 1991). As in the public health campaigns described above, most reasonable people would find plausible the idea that when an individual associates a current possession with a disgust experience, that possession will become less attractive than before and will be more likely to be replaced. If someone receives a foul-smelling package, she is likely to favor exchanging it for a fresh one. But what if careful thought causes the owner to understand that the disgusting experience should not in fact influence the attractiveness of the possession? For example, suppose the Disgust disposal effect 5 package’s foul smell obviously came from the outside of the box, and that the metal object inside was unlikely to be contaminated. Will the offended owners still choose to reject their status quo object in favor of alternatives? Or what if it became clear that the source of the disgust one happened to feel had nothing to do with the package (e.g., it came from passing a dead animal) and that there was nothing inherently disgusting about the package itself? Would disgust still trigger a desire to dispose of one’s possessions? We conjecture it would. In the present study, we investigate a strong version of the conjectured carryover effect of disgust. They present a “strong” test for the following two reasons. First, we induce disgust in an experimental process rather than having participants observe it in life experience which, we believe, renders the intensity of the disgusting experience lower than what one would find in real life. Second, we employ a choice process that involves objects that clearly have nothing to do with the source of the disgust. Three Alternative Hypotheses Based on the literature, at least three alternative hypotheses can be theoretically derived to describe the relationship between disgust and the status quo bias. We start with the null. Hypothesis 0: Incidental disgust exerts no influence on the status quo bias. This pattern may occur for two quite different reasons. First, rational decision theory would hold that because incidental disgust is unrelated to the inherent attractiveness of two options, it should have no effect on the choice between them (Raiffa, 1997). Second, influential theories of affect and judgment (for review, see Forgas, 2003) would hold that, because emotional valence powerfully affects judgment and decision outcomes, disgust could therefore elicit a generalized devaluation of both present and potential possessions. If so, decision makers may simply make Disgust disposal effect 6 the choice they otherwise would, perceiving neither a current possession nor a potential acquisition to be valuable. If null Hypothesis 0 is refuted, then Hypotheses 1 and 2, which predict effects in opposite directions, should be tested. Hypothesis 1: Incidental disgust amplifies the status quo bias. This hypothesis derives from the classic literature on arousal/social facilitation, which shows that increases in general arousal cause individuals to display their dominant response to the stimulus situation. (See, for example, Foster, Witcher, Campell, & Green, 1998; Zajonc, 1965). Disgust can be considered an emotion that intensifies arousal, if one considers the sympathetic nervous system response on multiple dimensions (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990); therefore, it should amplify the dominant response of retaining a status quo possession. Hypothesis 2: Incidental disgust counteracts status quo bias. This hypothesis derives from the appraisal-tendency framework (ATF; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; for update, see Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007), which assumes that specific emotions give rise to cognitive and motivational characteristics that can account for the effect of each emotion on individuals’ decisions. The ATF posits that disgust, which revolves around the appraisal theme of being too close to an indigestible object or an idea (for elaboration, see Lazarus, 1991), will evoke an implicit tendency to dispose of current objects (Frijda, 1986; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). If so, even incidental disgust would motivate decision makers to wish to expel a status quo commodity. Disgust would promote disposal, and would thereby counteract status quo bias. Disgust disposal effect 7 If a disgust-disposal effect is found, it would reinforce an emerging literature demonstrating that emotions can profoundly alter otherwise robust regularities of human decision processes, i.e., the preference for a status quo over an alternative in the present case. (For a review see Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003) Moreover, it would reinforce surprising findings in the literature that even incidental emotions—i.e., emotions triggered by a factor unrelated to the decision at hand—can reverse people’s choices that have real monetary consequences (e.g., Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004). In effect, it would add to the growing evidence that emotions have the ability to muddle and overpower rational choice processes, thereby influencing decisions to which they have no relevance. Finally, if either of the carryover patterns described is found when incidental disgust is induced, it is likely to be a non-conscious process. That is, gut feelings rather than deliberative processing would drive the phenomenon. If they do, decision makers will lack clear insight into the emotional influences on their choice (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). The present paper will test this conjecture about insight and will also study whether calling participants’ attention to the phenomenon alters their choices. Study 1 Study 1 took the form of a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial in which the emotion condition was crossed with two commodities. The commodities were a square box and an oblong box of approximately equal weight and volume (see Figure 1). The participants were told the boxes contained office/school supplies of equivalent value. We presented undisclosed commodities in generic boxes that appeared equivalent in order to facilitate a clean test of the hypotheses, to ensure the results would generalize, and to clarify the decision processes of participants, who had little reason to choose one box over the other. Disgust disposal effect 8 Method Design and participants One-hundred-and-six individuals (54 males, 50 females, 2 unspecified) from a university community participated in exchange for a $10 show-up payment and their chosen option. Participants ranged in age from 16 to 29 (M = 20). Participants sat in cubicles and could not see each other. They were given instructions that charged them with two separate tasks, which were combined for convenience. Before they began the first task, participants randomly received either an oblong box or a square box, which they were told to retain for later use (see Figure 1). Emotion induction. Participants were randomly assigned to either a disgust condition or a neutral condition. Disgust-condition participants watched a previously validated (Lerner et al., 2004) video clip portraying a man using a filthy toilet (from the film Trainspotting). Neutralcondition participants watched a previously validated (Lerner et al., 2004) video clip about the Great Barrier Reef (from a National Geographic special), a nature documentary selected for its neutral effect on emotions. Immediately after watching their clip, participants in the disgust condition were asked to write about how they would feel if they were in the situation depicted, and participants in the neutral condition were asked to write about their daily activities. Trading decision. To encourage a sense of ownership over the generic boxes, participants were invited to shake their box and guess what kind of office/school supplies the box may contain. Next, participants were given a new box that they were also invited to shake. They were told that the new box contained a different kind of office/school supplies that were of equivalent value to those in the “old” box. Participants were then asked to decide whether to keep the old box or exchange it for the new one. Participants’ preferences between the status Disgust disposal effect 9 quo (the old box) and the alternative (the new box) were measured drawing on established paradigms in experimental economics (e.g., Knetsch & Sniden, 1984). Manipulation check. Immediately after making the trading decision, participants were asked to report how intensely they felt each of 20 emotions. Four negative emotions were of primary interest: anger, sadness, fear, and disgust. Final Questionnaire. Participants also answered an open-ended question: Why did you choose to exchange/keep the box you were given? Finally, they answered demographic questions. While participants completed the questionnaire, the experimenter exchanged boxes for those who chose to trade. Participants kept the contents of their boxes. Results Manipulation check Emotions were effectively induced, both in magnitude and specificity. Neutral-condition participants reported feeling significantly more neutral than disgusted (Mn = 3.72 versus Md = 0.24), t (52) = 10.44, p < .001. Disgust-condition participants reported feeling significantly more disgusted than neutral (Md = 5.54 versus Mn = 2.32), t (52) = 6.49, p < .001. They also reported feeling significantly more disgust than the three other primary negative emotions: anger, sadness, and fear. Main analyses Trading propensities. The data were analyzed using logistic regressions. Regardless of which commodity was randomly chosen to serve as the status quo, disgust-condition participants were significantly more likely (50.9%) to trade away their status-quo commodity than were neutral-condition participants (32.1%). The difference was significant: Wald χ (1, N = 106) = 4.778, p < .05, Φ = .21. Note the significant status quo bias in the neutral condition; less than a Disgust disposal effect 10 third of these participants traded away their item. Comparing the two box conditions, it is worth nothing that participants were less willing to trade away the oblong than the square box, suggesting an unpredicted preference for that box, other factors held equal (see Table 1). The critical finding for us, however, is that the difference in the propensity to trade was virtually identical across the two types of boxes. Support for main hypothesis. Our results reject Hypotheses 0 and 1. They support Hypothesis 2. Incidental disgust promotes disposal, and thereby counteracts status quo bias. The effect sizes were substantial, as reported above. Disgust more than doubled the propensity to dispose (oblong box) and raised it by more than half (square box), in accordance with the ATF. Rationales for choices. Participants’ explanations for choosing their preferred box were coded; the explanations conveyed no awareness of emotional carryover. Frequent and typical rationales for choosing a box included: “makes a more interesting noise,” “feels more useful,” and “feels heavier.” Discussion Study one, using two virtually generic commodities, found that disgust can drive choice even when decision makers have no good reason to prefer one item over another. Perhaps surprisingly, participants reported no influence of disgust on their choices, but identified other virtually irrelevant characteristics. Study 2 Carryover effects of disgust were solidly established in Study 1. As a means for gauging the potential importance of the phenomenon, Study 2 examined whether decision makers can Disgust disposal effect 11 self-correct for it when they were made aware of the possible carryover effects. Wilson and Brekke’s authoritative review (1994) of judgment and decision biases identifies four factors necessary for bias correction: 1) awareness of unwanted processing; 2) awareness of direction and magnitude of the bias; 3) motivation to correct bias; 4) ability to adjust response. Study 3 will provide the first three of these factors in an effort to observe whether the fourth factor applies in this context. If, after providing all three factors, we observe no carryover, then one may conclude that disgusted decision-makers are indeed able to correct the carryover. The phenomenon may hold less import if it is easily corrected. We hypothesize, however, that the carryover of disgust will remain. If correcting the disgust-disposal effect requires mentally disentangling the incidental disgust prime from the choice objects, the disgust-disposal effect, which seemed to be driven by gut feelings rather than deliberative processing, is unlikely to be corrected even when decision makers’ attention is called to the phenomenon. Thus, we proposed: Hypothesis 3: An otherwise effective warning will not negate the disgust-disposal effect Method Study 2 took the form of a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial in which the emotion condition was crossed with a warning. We made the oblong box the status quo, thus avoiding consideration of a further experimental factor (In Study 1, the results for both boxes supported Hypothesis 2). Moreover, since the oblong box produced a higher ratio of trade behavior between the disgust and neutral conditions, it allowed more potential to find a warning effect for disgust. Design and participants Disgust disposal effect 12 One-hundred-and-twenty university students (74 males, 45 females, 1 unspecified) participated in exchange for class credit. Participants’ ages ranged from 18-25 (M = 20). Procedures matched those of Study 1, except as noted. Warning. After the emotion induction and before making their choices, half the participants received a strongly stated written warning regarding emotional carryover from the film clip they had just seen. (Text of manipulation) Watching film clips in the first part of the study can bias choices in the second part. Specifically, having just seen an unpleasant film can increase your desire to get rid of things you have in your possession. Likewise, having just seen a pleasant film clip can increase your desire to keep things you have in your possession. Because we are interested in studying how people can avoid being biased, please try your absolute best to avoid having any influence of the film clip on your decisions about the box! Give us your honest choice, reflecting your own feelings about the box, regardless of the film clip you viewed. In the warning, the films were respectively referred to as “pleasant” and “unpleasant,” corresponding to neutraland disgust-conditions. The warning specified the direction of potential bias: pleasant films (neutral condition) bias toward retaining the object possessed, whereas unpleasant firms (disgust condition) bias toward getting rid of the object. Everyone received the text above, which gave condition-specific warnings. Trading decision. Following Study 1’s methods, subjects were then given the second box, allowed to handle/shake it, and asked whether they wished to make a trade. Results Manipulation check Emotion inductions were effective in magnitude and specificity. Neutral-condition participants reported feeling significantly more neutral than disgusted (Mn = 3.30 versus Md = 0.43 respectively), t (60) = 3.07, p = .003. Disgust-condition participants reported feeling significantly more disgusted than neutral (Md = 3.68 versus Mn = 2.37 respectively), t (58) = Disgust disposal effect 13 6.49, p < .001. Disgust-condition participants also reported feeling significantly more disgust than any other measured negative emotion, including anger, sadness, and fear. These results were consistent with Study 1. The warning was noted by participants: 91.7% said they remembered the warning about the possible biasing effects of the film, and 87.2% said the warning was believable.