Knowledge-based Accounts of Rationality
نویسنده
چکیده
2 Research plan 3 2.1 Current state of research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1.1 The dominant internalist account of rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1.2 Externalist challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Current state of our research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2.1 Pascal Engel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2.2 Fabrice Teroni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2.3 Julien Dutant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2.4 Jacques Vollet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3 Detailed research plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3.1 First stage: knoweldge-based accounts by domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3.2 Second stage: fully general knowledge-based accounts of rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3.3 Third stage: integration with decision theory and further issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.4 Timetable and milestones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4.1 Distribution of tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4.2 Research seminar – organisation and expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4.3 Research seminar – schedule and milestones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.4.4 Tasks in combination to the seminar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.4.5 Jacques Vollet’s doctorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.4.6 Overall timeline of the project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.5 Importance and Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
منابع مشابه
Cognitive success: instrumental justifications of normative systems of reasoning
In the first part of the paper (sec. 1-4), I argue that Elqayam and Evan's (2011) distinction between normative and instrumental conceptions of cognitive rationality corresponds to deontological vs. teleological accounts in meta-ethics. I suggest that Elqayam and Evans' distinction be replaced by the distinction between a-priori intuition-based vs. a-posteriori success-based accounts of cogniti...
متن کاملEmpirical Rationality in the Stock Market
Rational expectations models make stringent assumptions on the agent’s knowledge about the true model. This paper introduces a model in which the rational agent realizes that using a given model involves approximation errors, and adjusts behavior accordingly. If the researcher accounts for this empirical rationality on part of the agent, the resulting empirical model assigns likelihood to the d...
متن کاملApplication of Rumi\'s Educational Implications and Critical Theorists
Purpose: This study aims to investigate and analyze the application of Rumi's educational implications and critical theorists. Methodology: The research community consisted of published sources in the fields of Rumi's educational ideas and critical theorists. Data collection has continued until data adequacy is achieved. The method of data analysis was descriptive-analytical. In this method, t...
متن کاملTR-2010007: Robust Knowledge of Rationality
Stalnaker provided an example of a perfect information game in which common knowledge of rationality does not yield backward induction. However, in his example, knowledge is treated as defeasible: players forfeit their knowledge of rationality at some vertices. This is not how ‘knowledge’ is understood in epistemology where, unlike belief, it is not subject to revision. In this respect, the Sta...
متن کامل