Statistical comparison of aggregation rules for votes
نویسندگان
چکیده
If individual voters observe the true ranking on a set of alternatives with error, then the social choice problem, that is, the problem of aggregating their observations, is one of statistical inference. This study develops a statistical methodology that can be used to evaluate the properties of a given voting or aggregation rule. These techniques are then applied to some well-know rules.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematical Social Sciences
دوره 57 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009