Oligopoly à la Cournot-Nash in Markets with a Continuum of Traders∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with trade in a model of noncooperative exchange with some large traders and many small traders in which traders are allowed to buy and sell each commodity. Moreover, we show, by an example, that, even with identical large traders of equal measure, our model yields Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations which are not Walrasian. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D51.
منابع مشابه
Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders
In this paper, we study three prototypical models of noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders: the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991), the model of Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Lloyd S. Shapley, and the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Busetto et al. (2008). We argue that these models are all distinct and only the Shapley’s model w...
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