Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider generalizations of the Gale-Shapley (1962) Stable Marriage Problem to threesided families. Alkan (1988) gave an example which shows that in the case of general preferences stable matchings do not always exist. Here we suggest a more compact example. Danilov (2001) proved that stable matchings exist for some acyclic preferences and he raised the problem for the lexicographical-cyclic preferences. Here we show that the answer is negative. We construct a three-sided system with lexicographical-cyclic preferences for which no stable matching exists.
منابع مشابه
Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
We consider stable three-dimensional matchings of three genders (3GSM). Alkan [Alkan, A., 1988. Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings. Mathematical Social Sciences 16, 207–209] showed that not all instances of 3GSM allow stable matchings. Boros et al. [Boros, E., Gurvich, V., Jaslar, S., Krasner, D., 2004. Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences. Discrete Mathematic...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Discrete Mathematics
دوره 289 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004