On a Dilemma of Conditional Obligation
نویسنده
چکیده
Conditional obligations play an important role in normative argumentation. A large number, if not the majority of norms have a conditional form: if p then it ought to be that q: An important class among the conditional obligations are the so-called commitments, that is, sentences of the form 'the performance of (the action described by) p commits one person to perform q'. The concept of conditional obligation has caused deontic logicians much trouble. Many proposals were made how to formalize the notion properly, but none of them has proved satisfactory. The dilemma can be summarized as follows: it seems necessary to have a form of detachment rule so that one can proceed from conditional to unconditional obligation, if the condition is satissed. On the other hand, if the rule of detachment is allowed, then in many cases one can deduce too much: from intuitively consistent premisses one can deduce contradictory consequences. The best-known example for such counter-intuitive results is Chisholm's contrary-to-duty paradox. The aim of my paper is to propose a simple solution to this problem. I shall show that Chisholm's contrary-to-duty paradox can be solved in a very simple way. In monadic deontic logic, there are two natural candidates for formalizing the notion of conditional obligation. Some authors suggest the formula "O(p q)", others the formula "p Oq" as the formalization of the sentence: "q ought to be under the condition p". The rst formula is favored, e.g., by von Wright ((7], 8]), and the second by, e.g. Chisholm ((4]) and Weinberger ((6].) Both suggestions have their own drawbacks. It is well-known that the following formulae are valid in standard deontic logic (SDL): Fp O(p q) (1) Oq O(p q) (2) Thus, if "O(p q)" is to be read as "p commits you to do q" then formula (1) suggests that doing something forbidden commits one to do anything, and formula (2) that anything commits one to do one's duty. One may try otherwise and use "p Oq" to formalize the notion of commitment. However, similar problems arise: the following formulae are valid for SDL:
منابع مشابه
Prima Facie Obligation
This paper presents a nonmonotonic deontic logic based on commonsense entailment. It establishes criteria a successful account of obligation should satisfy, and develops a theory that satisfies them. The theory includes two conditional notions of prima facie obligation. One is constitutive; the other is epistemic, and follows nonmonotonically from the constitutive notion. The paper defines unco...
متن کاملConditional Obligation and Positive Permission for Agents in Time
This paper investigates the semantic treatment of conditional obligation, explicit permission (often called positive permission), and prohibition based on models with agents and branched time. In such models branches (rather than moments) are taken as basic, and the branching provides a way to represent the indeterminism which is normally presupposed by talk of free will, responsibility, action...
متن کاملCoping with the Obligation Dilemma: Prototypes of Social Workers in the Nursing Home
We examined the ways in which the social worker is coping with obligation dilemma in an Israeli nursing home. The research was conducted using semi-structured, in-depth interviews carried out with fifteen social workers employed in nursing homes. The interviews were analysed thematically, using constant comparisons. The three themes were concerned with the social worker's place in the nursing h...
متن کاملWhy Defeasible Deontic Logic needs a Multi Preference Semantics
There is a fundamental difference between a conditional obligation being violated by a fact, and a conditional obligation being overridden by another conditional obligation. In this paper we analyze this difference in the multi preference semantics of our defeasible deontic logic DEFDIODE. The semantics contains one preference relation for ideality, which can be used to formalize deontic parado...
متن کامل[The effects of information of the other's cooperative behavior on moral obligation].
Although it is expected that a social dilemma is solved by giving people feedback information about others' cooperative behavior, previous studies demonstrated that the information may promote cooperative behavior in some situations but may promote non-cooperative behavior in other situations. The study hypothesize that the feedback information of the others' cooperative behavior promote cooper...
متن کامل