Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing

ince the eruption of the second intifada in September 2000, Israel has openly pursued a policy of targeted killing. The Israelis have identified, located, and then killed alleged Palestinian terrorists with helicopter gunships, fighter aircraft, tanks, car bombs, booby traps, and bullets. Approximately eighty Palestinian militants and about fifty innocent bystanders have been killed through fall 2002, prompting international condemnation, domestic soulsearching, and bloody retaliation. Given its controversial nature and obvious costs, it is worth considering whether this policy is defensible. Why has Israel embarked on a policy of targeted killing? Has the policy been effective in reducing Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians? Is targeted killing permitted by Israeli and international law? Can it be justified in moral terms? For Israel, it is necessary to know whether its policy is pragmatically and ethically justified. If it is, it makes sense for Israel to continue this approach. If there are serious shortcomings, they need to be highlighted so that the policy can be modified or discarded. For countries other than Israel, and especially the United States, assessing the worth of targeted killings is hardly less significant. Ever since September 11, much of the world, with the United States in the lead, has sought ways to counter terrorism. If the Israelis have a successful approach, it makes sense to emulate it. If Israeli policy is fundamentally flawed, however, better to understand that now, especially when voices demanding that terrorists be hunted down and killed have grown so loud. Either way, learning from the Israeli experience is central to those seeking to combat the threat from terrorism. If it can be directed against military, albeit irregular, combatants as opposed to political adversaries as determined by a formal, open process, targeted killing is acceptable under the international law governing warfare. Targeted killing has not appreciably diminished the costs of terrorist attacks and may have, in the short term, even increased them. But if those targeted cannot or will not be apprehended by the Palestinian Authority (PA) or the Israeli armed forces, the policy is the only way to mete out justice to perpetrators of violence against Israeli civilians. Over the long term, the policy may reduce the capacity of terrorist networks to carry out attacks. So long as Israel’s adversaries target civilians as a prime goal of their operations,