Implemeting the ” Wisdom of the Crowd ” ∗ Ilan Kremer †

Implemeting the ” Wisdom of the Crowd ” ∗

We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents arrive sequentially and each in turn chooses one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information that becomes available affects the incentives of an agent to explore and generate new information. We characterize the optimal disclosure policy of a planner whose goal is to maximizes social welfare. One interpretation for o...

Crowd Learning without Herding: A Mechanism Design Approach

Crowdfunding, Internet websites, and health care are only a few examples of markets in which agents make decisions not only on the basis of their own investigations and knowledge, but also on the basis of information from a "central planner" about other agents’ actions. While such reciprocal learning can be welfare-improving, it may reduce agents’ incentives to conduct their own investigations,...

The Effect of Analyst Coverage on Corporate Voluntary Disclosure, Price Effi ciency and Liquidity

Not Only What But also When A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Envy-freeness and Implementation in Large Economies

We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness is a necessary condition for a form of robust approximate implementation in large economies. JEL classi cation numbers: D78, D51, D71 Envy-Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies Matthew O. Jackson Ilan Kremer