When Co-management Fails: A Review of Theory and Lessons Learned from Reservoir Fisheries in the Dry-Zone of Sri Lanka

Over recent decades co-management has become an increasingly popular form of governance reform in many developing countries. Viewed as a means of promoting sustainable and equitable management of natural resources, it has seen wide application in small-scale inland fisheries. However, perhaps because of its worthy credentials, there has been insufficient critical assessment of the results. This paper commences with a review of underlying theory which is then used to explore the reasons for failure of a co-management initiative in Sri Lankan reservoir fisheries between 2001 and 2002. Co-management thinking arose from an earlier body of common property theory (CPT) which posited private or public ownership of the commons as the only rational response to increasing resource pressure. By contrast the co-management view states that under certain conditions, management is best left to local users, with support from the state, civil society or market sector where necessary. In turn, critics of co-management's rationalistic underpinnings point to a lack of cultural or political embeddedness which limits understanding of how power and accountability is distributed and shapes collective behaviour. Others suggest that the contentiousness of the CPT / co-management debate has resulted in neglect of key empirical features of fisheries commons – most critically the complex causes and consequences of change in fishing effort. In the Sri Lankan case-study, emphasis is on understanding the environmental, technical and socioeconomic drivers of effort change. The co-management initiatives took place in two small-medium size reservoirs (788ha and 1546ha) in Northwest province. These support artisanal gill-net fisheries, predominantly for exotic tilapias marketed on a highly local basis. The co-management strategy which involved local fisheries officers and fishing cooperatives , centred on fishing restrictions designed to sustain yields and increase mean catch size. Despite initial enthusiasm, the restrictions collapsed after 4-5 months with the onset of opportunistic free-riding. This was due to; lack of enforcement capacity, disproportionate hardship faced by the least economically mobile fisher groups and political patronage relations. Also, as compliant partners, the cooperatives had weak leverage in the decision making process. Despite the short duration of effective restrictions, simultaneous analysis of local market trends demonstrated a remarkable rebound in yields pointing to the resilient regenerative capacity of the tilapia fishery. Furthermore historic commodity price data reveal long-term tilapia price stability and a close match between demand and supply even as fishing pressure has increased. Despite negative impacts on indigenous biodiversity, these features suggest fears of …