Conventions and Local Interaction Structures:
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine in how far local interaction structures have effects on players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: first, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods (see also Keser, Ehrhart, and Berninghaus, Economics Letters, 1998). Second, when players are allocated around a circle, the neighborhood size has, in the long run, no effect on the players' strategy choices. Third, with the same neighborhood size, players allocated on a lattice tend less than players allocated around a circle to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. This is true although the players are given exactly the same instructions. * Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 (Project C4) at the University of Mannheim is gratefully acknowledged. ** Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe, Gebäude 20.21, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Tel. +49 721 608 3380, Fax + 49 721 608 3491 1999 Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Claudia Keser
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