Rational Probabilistic Deciders—Part II: Collective Behavior

نویسندگان

  • P. T. Kabamba
  • W.-C. Lin
  • S. M. Meerkov
  • Jingshan Li
چکیده

This paper explores the behavior of rational probabilistic deciders (RPDs) in three types of collectives: zero sum matrix games, fractional interactions, and Edgeworth exchange economies. The properties of steady states and transients are analyzed as a function of the level of rationality, N , and, in some cases, the size of the collective, M. It is shown that collectives of RPDs, may or may not behave rationally, depending, for instance, on the relationship between N and M (under fractional interactions) or N and the minimum amount of product exchange (in Edgeworth economies). The results obtained can be useful for designing rational reconfigurable systems that can autonomously adapt to changing environments.

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تاریخ انتشار 2007