Corruption and Resource Allocation under China’s Dual-Track System

نویسندگان

  • Wei Li
  • Roger Gordon
  • Gary Jefferson
  • Barry Naughton
چکیده

Detailed transaction and price data from 769 Chinese state-owned enterprises reveal that corruption — official diversion of under-priced in-plan industrial goods to the market — was pervasive in China between 1980 and 1989. More important, corruption has a significant impact on the allocation of both in-plan and outside-plan resources in ways that are consistent with implications of an extended version of Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) model of corruption. The empirical findings expose a serious downside of China’s gradualist reform strategy — corruption. In addition to distorting the allocation of resources, corruption had been blamed for undermining popular support for the reform in 1989. JEL classification: L51, L12, P21

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تاریخ انتشار 1999