Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
نویسنده
چکیده
Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Author(s): Salvador Barberá Source: International Economic Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 413-417 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Institute of Social and Economic Research -Osaka University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2648754 . Accessed: 28/08/2011 15:38
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