Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments
نویسنده
چکیده
An extension of Von Neumann Morgenstern solution theory to cooperative games without side payments has been outlined in [1]. In this paper we revise some of the definitions given in [1] and prove that in the new theory every threeperson constant sum game is solvable (see [1, Theorem 1]). Other results that were formulated in [1] had already been proved in [2]. [1 ; 2] are also necessary for a full understanding of the basic definitions of this paper.
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