Discounted Supermodular Stochastic Games: Theory and Applications
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper considers a general class of discounted Markov stochastic games characterized by multidimensional state and action spaces with an order structure, and one-period rewards and state transitions satisfying some complementarity and monotonicity conditions. Existence of pure-strategy Markov (Markov-stationary) equilibria for the nite (in nite) horizon game, with nondecreasing and possibly discontinuous strategies and value functions, is proved. The analysis is based on lattice programming, and not on concavity assumptions. Selected economic applications that t the underlying framework are described: dynamic search with learning, long-run competition with learning-by-doing, and resource extraction. JEL codes: C73, C61, D90.
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