Web Appendix: Do Opposites Detract? Intrahousehold Preference Heterogeneity and Inefficient Strategic Savings
نویسنده
چکیده
Proof. The proof will show that any strategy that results in both spouses going to the bank cannot be optimal. Note that if the second mover saves in account a, she will always save so that u′ (c1) = RaδBu (c2) (and must therefore only be saving at interest rate Ra). Now consider the options of the first mover. First suppose the second mover only deposits savings in the joint account. Then the first mover could simply place additional savings in the joint account to satisfy u′ ( y1 − s1 − s1 − b ) =
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