When is the Boston Mechanism Dominance-Solvable? - An Analysis of a Non-strategy-proof Mechanism∗

نویسنده

  • Chia-Ling Hsu
چکیده

This paper analyze the strategic aspect of a popular matching mechanism, the Boston mechanism, in the school choice problem. It is known that participants may not submit the true preferences when the Boston mechanism is used. This paper analyzes how participants submit their preferences in this popular mechanism by looking at the (iteratively) undominated strategies. I show that any (iteratively) undominated strategies must belong to a class of strategies, the secure strategies. I also give a characterization such that the game induced by the Boston mechanism is dominance-solvable. The implication of the findings is providing a tool for analyzing other non-strategy-proof mechanisms. It does not undermine the desirability for a mechanism to be strategy-proof but instead provides more understanding of the reasons why a mechanism is not strategy-proof. In addition, when a non-strategy-proof mechanism is not allowed to change for exogenous reasons, this paper may have implication for finding the best performance that mechanism can achieve by looking at the undominated strategies. JEL: C72, C78, D78, I20.

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تاریخ انتشار 2012