Campaign Rhetoric and Policy Making under Career Concerns
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper I develop a model of political platform choice and subsequent policy implementation decisions by political candidates who are primarily motivated by career concerns. Although political platforms are non binding, politicians have some incentive to keep campaign promises in order to uphold their reputation. I analyze the electoral outcome and the determinants which influence the decision to break campaign promises. JEL Classification: D8
منابع مشابه
The Evolving Regulatory Role of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
On New Year’s Eve of 2001, after the disputed Florida recount, I received a call from the Bush–Cheney transition team. They asked me to consider a senior regulatory post in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the largest unit within the Executive Office of the President. The call was a pleasant surprise since I had not been involved in the Bush–Cheney campaign. In fact, I answered ginger...
متن کاملObama’s Counterterrorism Policy and the Washington Post’s Editorials: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Media-State Interaction
American mass media’s relation with the US government in foreign policy decision-making has been the subject of numerous studies in the interdisciplinary field of political communication. This paper reexamines the interaction between the media and the government in the US foreign policy decision-making process, analyzing the possible congruity and/or incongruity between The Washington Post...
متن کاملThe Rhetoric of War: Words, Conflict, and Categorization Post-9/11
An atmosphere of crisis enhances the power, especially of the Executive Branch, to frame and shape the characterization, understanding, and reality of conflict. This Article addresses the language, rhetoric, status, and legality of “war” by examining the complexity of decision-making for policy-makers in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It does so by looking both in...
متن کاملGood and Bad Consistency in Regulatory Decisions1
We examine sources of consistent regulatory decisions in a model where regulators respond to mixed incentives, including career concerns. In the reference case, regulators act as "public servants" who strive to make the socially optimal decision, given limited information and the opportunity to observe the prior decision of another regulator. The addition of career concerns, such as a desire to...
متن کاملParty Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics
Polities di¤er in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex post incentives facing individual legislators, whose interests may be more parochial. We study how di¤ere...
متن کامل