Small Support Equilibria in Large Games

نویسنده

  • Yakov Babichenko
چکیده

In this note we provide a new proof for the results of Lipton et al. [3] on the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium with logarithmic support size. Besides its simplicity, the new proof leads to the following contributions: 1. For n-player games, we improve the bound on the size of the support of an approximate Nash equilibrium. 2. We generalize the result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4] on small probability games from the two-player case to the general n-player case. 3. We provide a logarithmic bound on the size of the support of an approximate Nash equilibrium in the case of graphical games. Center for the Mathematics of Information, Department of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, California Institute of Technology. e-mail:[email protected]. The author wishes to thank Constantinos Daskalakis and Siddarth Barman for useful discussions and comments. The author gratefully acknowledges support from a Walter S. Baer and Jeri Weiss fellowship.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection

This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. JEL classifications: C72, D82.

متن کامل

On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games

One reason for wanting to compute an (approximate) Nash equilibrium of a game is to predict how players will play. However, if the game has multiple equilibria that are far apart, or ǫ-equilibria that are far in variation distance from the true Nash equilibrium strategies, then this prediction may not be possible even in principle. Motivated by this consideration, in this paper we define the no...

متن کامل

The Complexity of Nash Equilibria as Revealed by Data

In this paper we initiate the study of the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games that are specified via data. This direction is motivated by an attempt to connect the emerging work on the computational complexity of Nash equilibria with the perspective of revealed preference theory, where inputs are data about observed behavior, rather than explicit payoffs. Our results ...

متن کامل

Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games: A Graph Theoretic Approach

We study the existence and tractability of a notion of approximate equilibria in bimatrix games, called well supported approximate Nash Equilibria (SuppNE in short). We prove existence of ε−SuppNE for any constant ε ∈ (0, 1), with only logarithmic support sizes for both players. Also we propose a polynomial–time construction of SuppNE, both for win lose and for arbitrary (normalized) bimatrix g...

متن کامل

BEST-REPLY DYNAMICS IN LARGE ANONYMOUS GAMES By

We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most cn logn steps for some constant c > 0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit freque...

متن کامل

On the existence of equilibria in discontinuous games: three counterexamples

We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny [4] and still obtain existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in quasiconcave normal form games, or, at least, existence of pure strategy ε−equilibria for all ε > 0. We show by examples that there are: 1. quasiconcave, payoff secure games without pure strategy ε−equilibria for small enough ε > 0 (and hence, without pure strategy Nash...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1305.2432  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013