STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY: a revealed preference analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
Extended Abstract: The most familiar setting for revealed preference analysis is that of consumer demand. In that context, Afriat’s Theorem (1967) gives necessary and sufficient conditions on a collection of observations to be consistent with the maximization of a monotone utility function, where each observation consists of a price vector and a demand bundle. Afriat’s Theorem is the starting point of a considerable body of empirical work investigating the rationality of agent behavior and it has also been extended in various ways; for example, there are tests for stronger restrictions on the utility function such as expected utility or weak separability.
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